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THE COLOMBIAN BANKING CRISIS:





While in the early nineties Colombia grew at rates exceeding 4% and
was catalogued as one of the top emerging markets, in 1999 its economy fell
4%, its exchange rate regime (a target zone) collapsed and by June of 2000
its unemployment level peaked at 20.4%. This turn of events is clearly asso-
ciated to an episode of ﬁnancial distress and a troubled intermediary sector
that has haunted the Colombian economy in the late 1990’s. The purpose of
this paper is to understand the macroeconomic consequences of the recent
ﬁnancial crisis in Colombia. I solve, calibrate and simulate a simple version
of the optimal growth model where banks absorb real resources from the
economy and are also vulnerable to crises. The results are useful because
they replicate the recent behavior of several macroeconomic variables in
Colombia. Moreover, they give some insight into what should be expected
from these variables in the near future. There are two fundamental take
aways. First, the negative wealth and welfare eﬀects of the Colombian ﬁ-
nancial crisis are non-negligible and long lasting (ﬁve years approximately).
Second, the data suggests that the crisis which permeated the Colombian
ﬁnancial system since the last months of 1997 or ﬁrst months of 1998 has
been deepened by another adverse ﬁnancial shock that hit the Colombian
intermediary sector in mid/late 1999.
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Recent episodes of ﬁnancial crises have painfully reminded us the importance of
as o u n dﬁnancial system for successful economic performance1.T h e e x p e r i e n c e
of Mexico in 1994 and the Asian crisis of 1997 illustrate the vulnerability of an
economy to a fragile ﬁnancial sector. Despite the fact that Thailand, Malaysia,
Indonesia and South Korea all displayed strong macro fundamentals by that time,
overinvestment, excessive risk-taking and poor regulation in their ﬁnancial systems
eventually spurred balance of payments crises in all these countries [see Krugman
(1998), Corsetti et. al. (1998), Schneider and Tornell (1999)]2. The economic
consequences of these crises were unpleasant not only in the region but also in
other countries because of contagion eﬀects (e.g. Russia, Argentina and other
L a t i nA m e r i c a nc o u n t r i e s ) .
More recent episodes of banking crises include Ecuador and Colombia. Sys-
tematic failures of banks in these two countries led their economies into deep
recession and dramatic unemployment levels. This year Ecuador announced the
abandonment of its currency and dollarization of its economy as a step towards
economic and ﬁnancial recovery. While in the early nineties Colombia grew at
rates exceeding 4% and was catalogued as one of the top emerging markets, in
1999 its economy fell 4% and by June of 2000 its unemployment level peaked at
20.4%. The recent banking crisis in Colombia was also accompanied by a currency
crisis. In 1999 its exchange rate regime (a target zone) collapsed and the exchange
rate was allowed to ﬂoat freely.
Sadly, the Colombian currency crisis seems to ﬁt ﬁrst generation models due
to the fact that the country has been operating with serious macroeconomic mis-
alignment in recent years. Indeed, Colombia abandoned its exchange rate regime
in 1999 in the midst of a deep ﬁscal gap. In 1999 the ﬁscal deﬁcit was 5.2% of
GDP3.A sar e s u l t ,i n t e r n a t i o n a lﬁnancial markets lost conﬁdence in the Colom-
bian economy and its sovereign debt ranking was reduced. For example, Standard
and Poors’s reduced the sovereign debt ranking in two notches from BBB- to BB4.
1The importance of the evolution of the ﬁnancial system for successful economic performance
has been widely documented in the literature [A good survey is found in Boyd and Smith (1995)].
2See also Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) for a good empirical analysis of banking crises as a
possible cause of balance of payments crises.
3Source: Banco de la Republica
4BBB: Adequate capacity to meet its ﬁnancial commitments. However, adverse economic
conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity of the
obligor to meet its ﬁnancial commitments.
2Unfortunately, the ﬁnancial crisis in Colombia enhanced its ﬁscal gap. In fact,
the ﬁscal cost of the bail out is approximately 6%5.
The Colombian case is the purpose of this paper. Speciﬁcally, I aim at un-
derstanding the macroeconomic consequences and possible duration of the recent
banking crisis. I solve, calibrate and simulate a simple version of the optimal
growth model where banks absorb real resources from the economy and are also
vulnerable to crises. Speciﬁcally, the Colombian ﬁnancial crisis is simulated. The
results are useful because they replicate the recent behavior of several macroeco-
nomic variables in Colombia. Moreover, they give some insight into what should
be expected from these variables in the near future. It is important to highlight
that explaining the cause of the crisis exceeds the ambition of this paper. My pur-
pose is only to understand the macroeconomic consequences and possible duration
of the recent banking crisis, independently of its cause.
The model has two sectors: i) a ﬁnal good producing sector and ii) a banking
sector. The banking sector operates as an intermediate good producer. Specif-
ically, it uses deposits from the previous period and current labor to provide
capital to the ﬁnal good producing sector, which also demands labor. This ap-
proach is useful because it recognizes the fact that intermediation is a real activity
that uses up real resources and not just an invisible entity or constraint on the
economy. Moreover, this treatment allows me to avoid complicated bank moti-
vating artifacts such as asymmetric information, moral hazard, CSV, Diamond’s
(1984) delegated monitoring or Diamond and Dyvbig’s (1983) liquidity preference
shocks. Intuitively, the approach means that all savings must be intermediated
by a resource absorbing ﬁnancial sector.
Additionally, the banking sector is subject to stochastic productivity shocks.
Adverse stochastic productivity shocks to the intermediary sector are associated
with episodes of banking crises or generalized ﬁnancial distress in the economy.
No doubt this is a very broad deﬁnition of what a banking or ﬁnancial crisis is.
Yet, it manages to capture the adverse eﬀects of mismanagement, overinvestment,
excessive risk taking, panics, poor regulation, unstable macroeconomic variables
and a weak institutional structure in an economy’s ﬁnancial system. As we know,
these illnesses are what usually trigger banking crisis phenomena. Consequently,
BB: Signiﬁcant speculative characteristics but less vulnerable in the near term than other
lower-rated obligors. However, it faces major ongoing uncertainties and exposure to adverse
business, ﬁnancial, or economic conditions which could lead to the obligor’s inadequate capacity
to meet its ﬁnancial commitments.
5Source: Foresight Colombia, July 4, 2000.
3it is reasonable to think that banking productivity falls during crisis episodes. An
alternative interpretation follows Bernanke (1983). During banking crises there
is a loss of intermediation capital which is simply bank-client private informa-
tion that rises intermediation productivity. Thus, an adverse stochastic shock to
the productivity of the ﬁnancial system is a simple way to pin down the loss of
intermediation capital during a banking crisis.
With and adverse stochastic productivity shock to the ﬁnancial system I am
not claiming that the only cause of the Colombian banking crisis is rooted in prob-
lems speciﬁc to the banking sector. I am not ruling out macroeconomic shocks
as a possible trigger of the banking crisis. For instance, with an unstable macro-
economic environment bank managers probably are less productive in forecasting
many of the relevant variables (interest rates, exchange rates, etc.) than in a stable
economy. Productivity in the ﬁnancial sector is not divorced from macroeconomic
performance. For sure, both micro and macro elements had a role in the crisis.
But this is not inconsistent with the way in which the crisis is engineered into the
model. The only purpose of the shock to the ﬁnancial sector is i) to recognize
that a crisis occurred and ii) to pin that crisis down in a simple and tractable way.
Recall that the goal of this paper is to analyze the macroeconomic consequences
and duration of the recent banking crisis in Colombia, independently of its cause.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section some facts regarding the
Colombian ﬁnancial crisis are reviewed. Section three presents the theoretical
model. In section four the model is solved after being calibrated for the Colombian
economy. The business cycle properties of the economy are also discussed in that




Troubled banking systems have always been around. From the long history of
ﬁnancial crises, those documented in the literature as generators of unemployment,
reduction in growth and instability are numerous. The most notorious example
4is the Great Depression (1929-1933) in the US6. Other examples include7:
• Argentina: 71 of 470 ﬁnancial institutions were liquidated between 1980 and
1982.
• Chile: Between 1981 and 1983 the government liquidated or intervened 45%
of the ﬁnancial system’s assets. In September of 1988 the central bank held
bad bank loans equivalent to 19% of GNP.
• Spain: Between 1978 and 1983 the government had to rescue intermediaries
holding 20% of total deposits.
• US.: During the period 1981-1988, 1100 Savings and Loan institutions
(S&L) were closed or merged. By 1989, 600 more were insolvent. These
had total assets above $250 billion. Their insurer, the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation, had a capital deﬁcit of $14 billion by the end
of March 1987. In March 1990, 290 thrift institutions with assets totaling
$130 billion were in conservatorship.
• US.: From 1985 to 1989, 803 banks insured by the Federal Insurance Deposit
Corporation and with assets totaling $100 billion failed or were merged.
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) identify and date more than 30 episodes
of banking sector distress during the period 1980-19958. Their list is perplexing
for it shows an immense variety of countries that have been exposed to periods
of systematic bank failures. It seems that ﬁnancial crises have infected all sort of
countries no matter their size, geographic location, level of economic development
6Many authors argue that one of the main causes of the Great Depression was the systematic
failure and suspension of banks. For instance, Bernanke (1983) claims that the severity of the loss
of intermediation capital (bank-client private information that rises intermediation productivity)
resulting from bank suspensions and failures was a fundamental factor behind the Depression.
Other authors [Cole and Ohanian (2000)] ﬁnd that banking shocks account only for a small
fraction of the Depression.
7This information was obtained from Garber and Weisbrod (1992).
8Their list includes Colombia (1982-1985), Finland (1991-1994), Guyana (1993-1995), In-
donesia (1992-1994), India (1991-1994), Israel (1983-1984), Italy (1990-1994), Jordan (1989-
1990), Kenya (1993), Sri Lanka (1989-1993), Mexico (1982, 1994), Mali (1987-1989), Malaysia
(1985-1988), Nigeria (1991-1994), Norway (1987-1993), Nepal (1988-1994), Philippines (1981-
1987), Papua New Guinea (1989-1994), Portugal (1986-1989), Senegal (1983-1988), Sweden
(1990-1993), Turkey (1991, 1994), Tanzania (1988-1994), U.S. (1981-1992), Uganda (1990-1994),
Uruguay (1981-1985), Venezuela (1993-1994), South Africa (1985).
5or per-capita GDP. Logically, some of these episodes of ﬁnancial distress were
more severe than others. Surely, their adverse macroeconomic eﬀects were also
diverse in magnitude and persistence.
2.2. The Recent Colombian Case
Recently, Colombia has been experiencing big troubles in its intermediary sector.
A considerable percentage of its ﬁnancial system has presented vulnerability to
failing or has actually failed. Those banks and ﬁnancial institutions that have
failed and several others that presented unhealthy balance sheets have been inter-
vened by the government in bail-out or capitalization operations. The following
table presents those institutions that were recently capitalized by the government.
Capitalization began in July 1999. The stock of assets is the one presented in May
2000. These institutions received a credit line from FOGAFIN and continue to
operate. Several other institutions were completely liquidated and ended their
operations. Note that more than 30% of the ﬁnancial system’s stock of assets has
been capitalized. Nine percentage points correspond to the private sector.
6Capitalization of Financial Institutions since July 1999



















Total Public 16,852,249 21.54%
TOTAL 23,875,872 30.52%
In short, the last two years can be described as an episode of generalized ﬁnan-
cial distress in the Colombian economy. The following two graphs are illustrative
of the Colombian ﬁnancial crisis. The ﬁrst graph presents the evolution of the
percentage of unproductive assets in the Colombian ﬁnancial sector during the
period January/1995 - May/2000. This percentage has been rising steadily since
1995. Yet, in early 1998 it started to rise faster and peaked in November of 1999
at 7.9%. In the last months the percentage of unproductive assets has declined to







































































































































;Whether the Colombian ﬁnancial crisis is over or not is a question that remains
to be answered. A simple inspection of the previous graphs indicates that the crisis
is not over yet. Indeed, the percentage of unproductive assets in the ﬁnancial
system has not fallen to pre-1995 levels. Additionally, the ﬁnancial sector’s net
worth continues to fall in real terms. Also, at the time this paper is being written
some ﬁnancial institutions are still on the verge of failure. Hence, it seems safe to
assume that the Colombian ﬁnancial crisis is not over.
Any episode of generalized ﬁnancial distress spreads to the rest of the economy
through the main macroeconomic variables. While in the early nineties Colombia
grew at rates exceeding 4% and was catalogued as one of the top emerging markets,
in 1999 its economy fell 4%. Its exchange rate regime (a target zone) also collapsed
during the same year and by june of 2000 its unemployment level peaked at 20.4%.
Hence, the recent behavior of relevant macroeconomic variables in Colombia is
key, especially if the crisis is not over yet. By comparing their behavior with
the behavior expected under a theoretical model that replicates the crisis, we can
predict the movement of these variables in the near future.
I focus on nine variables i) non ﬁnancial output, ii) ﬁnancial output, iii) GDP,
iv) consumption, v) percentage of employment allocated to the non-ﬁnancial sec-
tor, vi) wage, vii) deposit rate, viii) lending rate and ix) interest rate spread.
Appendix 1 presents graphs with the quarterly evolution of the natural log of
these variables for the period 1994:I - 2000:I9. The data was HP ﬁltered to elim-
inate their trend so that it is possible to concentrate only on their respective
cyclical ﬂuctuations10. Positive and negative values indicate above and below
trend percent deviations. The following facts are observed:
• C o n t r a c t i o no fn o n - ﬁnancial output starting in the second quarter of 1998.
In the second quarter of 1999 it started to recover but by the ﬁrst quarter
of 2000 it was still halfway below the previous peak.
• Contraction of ﬁnancial output starting in the last quarter of 1996. By the
ﬁrst quarter of 2000 it was still falling.
• Contraction of GDP starting in the last quarter of 1997. In the second
quarter of 1999 it started to recover but by the ﬁrst quarter of 2000 it was
still more than halfway below the previous peak.
9All these variables (except vi) are in real terms (and the ﬁrst four variables are in thousands
of millions of 1994 pesos).
10As Hodrick and Prescott recommend, a value of λ = 1600 w a su s e di no r d e rt oe l i m i n a t e
cycles of frequency higher than 32 periods (i.e. 8 years).
9• Contraction of consumption starting in the last quarter of 1997. In the
second quarter of 1999 it started to recover but by the ﬁrst quarter of 2000
it was still very close to the preceding trough.
• Fall of the real wage index starting in the third quarter of 1997. In the ﬁrst
quarter of 1999 it recovered signiﬁcantly but did not achieve the level of the
previous peak. In the fourth quarter of 1999 it started to fall again.
• Very small ﬂuctuations of the percentage of employment allocated to the
non-ﬁnancial sector.
• Fall of the real deposit rate starting in the third/fourth quarter of 1996.
Then, in the third/fourth quarter of 1997 it started to rise and reached, by
the ﬁrst quarter of 1999, a higher level than the previous peak level. Then
it started to fall again.
• Hike of the real loan rate starting in the fourth quarter of 1997. By the ﬁrst
quarter of 1999 it reached a new and higher peak but started to fall again.
• High rise of the real interest rate spread when comparing the ﬁrst quarter
of 2000 with the fourth quarter of 1997.
These facts surely characterize the environment of ﬁnancial distress under
which the Colombian economy is operating. They depict an unhealthy intermedi-
ary system whose symptoms began to show up towards the end of 1996 but that
deﬁnitely exploded in 1998/1999. Furthermore, the macroeconomic facts indicate
that today the ﬁnancial system is still under trouble. Ideally, any model that sim-
ulates the Colombian ﬁnancial crisis should replicate these observed qualitative
features in the main macroeconomic variables. One such model is to be developed
in the next section.
3. MODEL
3.1. Literature
Two traditions can be distinguished in the literature that incorporates banks into
growth models. The ﬁrst tradition follows Diamond (1965) and uses an over-
lapping generation (OLG) structure. Two examples of such class of models are
presented in Bhattacharya et. al. (1994) and Boyd and Smith (1995). Bhat-
tacharya et. al. motivate banks by assuming spatial separation and stochastic
10relocation among agents. The possibility of stochastic relocation among agents
plays the same role as Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) liquidity preference shocks.
Thus, banks arise to insure against random liquidity needs coming from stochastic
relocation. Competition among banks for depositors forces banks to chose return
schedules and portfolio allocations so as to maximize the expected utility of a
representative depositor. On the other hand, Boyd and Smith model banks by
diﬀerentiating between an observable (low average) return investment technology
and an unobservable (high average) return capital accumulation technology that
is also subject to costly state veriﬁcation (CSV). The authors associate the inten-
sive use of the unobservable technology to ﬁnancing investment with bank loans
whereas the use of the observable technology corresponds to investment ﬁnanced
with equity issues.
The second tradition of growth models with banking falls into the class of real
business cycle (RBC) models. Three of such models are those by Diaz-Gimenez
et. al. (1992), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995) and Chari et. al (1995). In the
Diaz-Gimenez et. al. model banks pool household’s savings and make two types
of loans. First, they lend to other households that want to borrow. Second,
they buy government issued interest-bearing debt. Speciﬁcally, the bank solves a
static maximization problem where the objective function is its end of period stock
of assets. Carlstrom and Fuerst motivate their banking sector by introducing a
cash-in-advance constraint on the wage bill paid by ﬁrms. Hence, the intermediary
accepts deposits from households, receives a monetary injection from the central
bank and loans out all this cash to ﬁrms so that wage bills can be paid. Chari
et. al. introduce banks by assuming two types of capital and that one of them
must be intermediated by the banking system. In the last two cases the objective
function of the bank is its instantaneous proﬁt.
Yet, none of these models addresses the issue of banking or ﬁnancial crises11.
Furthermore, these models assume that the intermediary sector does not use re-
sources from the economy. This boils down to assuming that the intermediary is
simply a constraint on the economy [Chari et. al. (1995)]12. In reality, a ﬁnan-
11The reason is that these papers study other issues: i) the role of equity (as opposed to bank
loan) ﬁnanced investment in the economic growth process [Boyd and Smith (1995)]; ii) budget
deﬁcits as the cause of indeterminacy of monetary equilibria and the use of reserve requirements
to eliminate the undesirable steady states [Bhattacharya et. al. (1994)]; iii) welfare costs of
alternative monetary and tax policies [Diaz-Gimenez et. al. (1992), Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1995)]; iv) the real eﬀects of following a procyclical interest rate policy rule [Diaz-Gimenez et.
al. (1992)]; v) the negative correlation between inﬂation and growth [Chari et. al (1995)].
12Some dynamic models do assume that banks need resources from the economy in order
11cial sector operates with real resources from the economy (labor and capital). In
practice, banks carry out a variety of costly activities in order to maintain certain
level of deposits and loans (e.g.: evaluating creditors, managing deposits, renting
buildings, maintaining ATM’s, etc.) [Edwards and Vegh (1997)]. For example, in
the US. between January of 1990 and January of 2000 more people were employed
in the ﬁnance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) sector than in the construction
sector. Also, during the same period employment in the FIRE sector was approxi-
mately one third of total employment in the Manufacturing sector13. In Colombia,
the ﬁnancial sector absorbs approximately 8% of employment.
3.2. Theoretical Model
In this model the economy is populated by an inﬁnite number of agents. Each
atomistic agent is endowed with one unit of labor which he/she supplies inelasti-
cally. There is no population growth. Instantaneous utility of each agent is U(Ct)
where Ct is consumption. Agents discount the future with factor β.I a s s u m e
that U(Ct) is well-behaved and exhibits local non-satiation. There is a ﬁnal good
(say, corn). It is produced with capital and labor according to the neoclassical
production function F(Kt,N1t) where Kt and N1t are the total stock of capital
and labor used by the ﬁnal good producing ﬁrm (ﬁrm hereafter). Now, the capital
stock used by the ﬁrm is not the same good as the ﬁnal good (i.e. it is not corn).
Instead, it is an intermediate good produced by a banking sector. This sector
uses savings of the ﬁnal good (in the form of deposits from the previous period)
and labor as inputs.
Simply put, the intermediary sector pools ﬁnal good that agents decided to
save in the previous period and (with some labor) produces an intermediate good
(called capital) that serves as input for ﬁnal good production. Banks operate
with the neoclassical production function G(Dt,N2t) where Dt represents total
deposits of ﬁnal good and N2t is labor used in the banking sector. This framework
implies that banks must intermediate all the savings. Note also that the stock of
deposits in any given period t is determined in t−1. Clearly, the dynamics of the
model come from deposits. I will ﬁrst focus on the planning problem and then
present the proper decentralization.
to operate. Two excellent examples are Cole and Ohanian (2000) for a closed economy and
Edwards and Vegh (1997) for a small, open economy.
13Source: US Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Condition (4) shows that along an optimal path the planner will equate the
marginal productivity of labor (in terms of ﬁnal good) across both sectors in
each period. Condition (5) is simply the Euler equation for this economy. If
the planner allocates one unit of ﬁnal output to consumption today she obtains
U0(C) additional units of happiness. If instead she carries that unit of ﬁnal output
t ot h en e x tp e r i o di nf o r mo fd e p o s i t s ,s h eo b t a i n sF1ezG1 units of additional
output tomorrow, each producing βU0(C0) units of current additional happiness.
Optimality implies that the planner must equate both such magnitudes in the
margin.
Let (K∗,D ∗,N1∗) be the steady state of the non-stochastic version of the

















Note that equations (6)-(8) constitute a system of three equations in three un-
knowns (K∗,D ∗,N1∗) which correspond to the steady state. This system is de-
rived by evaluating equations (4) and (5) and the deﬁnition of capital in (K∗,D ∗,N1∗).
Steady state (K∗,D∗,N1∗) is very important since it is a key ingredient for
the methods employed in this paper when solving for the optimal decision rules
D0(D,z) and N1(D,z) in the stochastic, non-stationary environment.
Now, computing the solution to the stochastic, non-stationary planning prob-
lem yields Pareto optimal allocations. Since the welfare theorems go through,
Pareto optimal allocations can also be supported with relative prices in a prop-
erly decentralized, market environment. This is the purpose of the next section.
3.2.2. Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium will be used to decentralize the planner’s
problem. This is an easy way to support the Pareto optimum given the recursive
14nature of the planner’s problem. In this setup there are three types of players:
i) households, ii) ﬁnal good producing ﬁrms and iii) banks. Additionally, there
are four markets: i) deposits market (bank demands, households supply); ii)
capital (or intermediate good) market (ﬁrm demands, bank supplies); iii) ﬁnal
good market (households demand, ﬁrm supplies); iv) labor market (ﬁrm and bank
demand, agents supply).
Each household solves the following dynamic programming problem:














where d is the household’s stock of deposits, D is the aggregate (per-capita) stock
of deposits in the economy, J(D,z) represents its law of motion, w(D,z) is the
wage and R(D,z) is the gross rental rate of deposits. Note that D and z are
aggregate state variables while d is an individual state variable. Intuitively, from
the household’s perspective d is something to be determined while D is simply
an exogenous variable over which it does not have any inﬂuence. The distinction
between d and D is fundamental to the notion of competitive equilibrium. Since
individual agents cannot inﬂuence relative prices due to their atomistic nature,
only aggregate state variables will determine the evolution of prices. Thus, w and
R can only depend on D and z and not on d.









where kf and hf represent the ﬁrm’s demand of capital and labor. On the other









where P(D,z) is the relative price of banking output (i.e. capital) while db and
hb represent the intermediary’s demand for deposits and labor. Again, note that
the relative price of the bank’s output depends only on aggregate state variables.
Deﬁnition 3.1. A recursive competitive equilibrium is:
151. A value function V (d,D,z)
2. An individual decision rule: d0(d,D,z).
3. A set of demands for the ﬁnal good producing ﬁrm: kf(D,z) and hf(D,z).
4. A set of demands for the bank: db(D,z) and hb(D,z).
5. A set of pricing functions: w(D,z), R(D,z) and P(D,z).
6. An aggregate decision rule: J(D,z).
such that
• Given (5) and (6), (1) and (2) solve P2.
• Given (5), (3) solves P3.
• Given (5), (4) solves P4.




• Perceptions are correct =⇒ d0(D,D,z)=J(D,z)
Note that P(D,z) − 1 can be interpreted as the loan rate while R(D,z) − 1
corresponds to the deposit rate. In equilibrium both rates are tied through an
optimality condition of the bank:
p(D,z)G1[D,h
b(D,z)] = R(D,z)
It is interesting to note that the interest rate spread of the economy (P/R)
is given by the inverse of the marginal productivity of deposits. The intuition
underlying this result is simple. The higher the marginal productivity of deposits,
the lower the interest rate that the bank can charge and the higher the deposit
rate it will recognize in order to satisfy its zero-proﬁt condition.
164. SOLUTION TO THE MODEL
4.1. Calibration















In the previous section I showed that Pareto optimal allocations can be sup-
ported with relative prices in a properly decentralized, market environment. Hence,
rather than solving the recursive competitive equilibrium I will compute the so-
lution to the planning problem. Whenever relative prices are of interest, the
recursive competitive equilibrium will be invoked.
Recall that the planner’s optimum is described by equations (4) and (5). In



















Condition (4’) depicts labor allocation eﬃciency and condition (5’) is just the
Euler equation for this economy. The steady state of the non-stochastic version


























Equations (6’)-(8’) constitute a system of three equations in (K,D,N1) which is
the steady state of the model. Steady state (K,D,N1) is very important because
it is a fundamental component of the tools employed in this paper to solve for
17the optimal decision rules D0(D,z) and N1(D,z) in the stochastic, non-stationary
version of the model.
Appendix 2 presents the way in which the parameters of this model (α,β,γ)
c a nb ec a l i b r a t e dt oﬁt some empirical features observed in the Colombian econ-
omy. Quarterly data from 1994 to 2000 was used. The following features were
employed: i) In average, the fraction of total labor allocated to non-ﬁnancial sec-
tors is 91.9%, and ii) in average the ratio of deposits to non-ﬁnancial output is
1.63. Due to lack of appropriate data, the following assumption was necessary :





To estimate the parameters of the stochastic process driving z (ρ,σ2
ε) Iu s ea s
proxy the cyclical component of the (natural log of) ﬁnancial output. Assuming




Certainty equivalence holds in the tools employed to solve the model. Thus,
the values for (ρ,σ2
ε) do not aﬀect the solution (i.e. decision rules) of the model.
Hence, the assumption about the values of (ρ,σ2
ε) is sensible enough to simulate
the ﬁnancial crisis yet it does not change the equilibrium path of the model. It
is important to highlight that the speciﬁc quantitative calibration of the model
is not fundamentally important for this paper. Beyond quantitative results, it is
qualitative insights what I am after. Besides very general quantitative conclusions,
this paper will be limited to the qualitative understanding of the macroeconomic
eﬀects of the Colombian ﬁnancial crisis.
4.2. Solving the Model
Recall the planning problem (P1):
14Since θ cannot be calibrated from the steady state equations, a value of θ =2 .0 is assumed.
Other values for θ were used but the qualitative results are not sensible to changes in this
parameter value.













As with any dynamic programming problem, we make an initial guess V0(D,z)
and then iterate on the value function until a ﬁxed point V (D,z) is found. Black-
well’s suﬃcient conditions for a contraction and the contraction mapping theorem
guarantee the existence of a unique ﬁxed point V (D,z). N o t et h a t( P 1 )c a nb e
simpliﬁed to:
V (D,z)=MaxD0,N1 {U [F(e











Given that the law of motion for z is linear, a quadratic approximation to the
utility function around (D,N1) facilitates the solution to Bellman’s equation in
(P1). In fact, this method of solution is called the linear-quadratic method and
yields linear decision rules for the control variables (D0,N1) as functions of the
state (D,z). Before proceeding with the linear quadratic method, an analyti-
cal solution for (D,N1) must be obtained since it is around this point that the


















































Using the calibrated parameters, the analytical steady state of the model, from




=[ 0 .1510,0.9190] (11)
With the analytical solution for (D,N1) and the corresponding quadratic ap-
proximation to the utility function around this point, the linear quadratic method
solves (P1). 117 iterations on the value function were required to pin down the
ﬁxed point of Bellman’s equation in (P1). The following linear decision rules for
D0 and N1 were obtained:
N1t =0 .9190 Y t (12)
Dt+1 =0 .0624 + 0.0658zt +0 .5868Dt (13)
Equation (12) shows that the fraction of total labor allocated to the ﬁnal
good producing sector (and, hence, to the ﬁnancial sector) is constant over time.
Stochastic productivity shocks to the bank do not induce a shift of labor across
sectors. This feature is striking because it reveals that these shocks are completely
absorbed by prices. The economics underlying this result is simple. A positive
stochastic productivity shock to the banking sector increases the marginal produc-
tivity of its labor. However, this shock also increases the supply of banking output
(i.e. capital). This brings down its relative price (p) and increases, ceteris paribus,
the marginal productivity of labor in the ﬁnal good producing sector. Thus, while
the marginal productivity of labor has risen in both sectors, the movement in p
20is such that the marginal productivity of labor in terms of ﬁnal good (i.e. the
wage) is equalized across both sectors without any change in labor allocations.
Nevertheless note that the resulting wage level (or marginal productivity of labor
in terms of ﬁnal good)i sh i g h e r .
Equation (13) simply depicts the path of deposit accumulation. Intuitively,
deposits for next period increase with the current stochastic productivity para-
meter of the banking sector (z). Furthermore, this equation shows that in the
absence of shocks deposits converge monotonically to their steady state level. Im-
portantly, the steady state that is inferred from (12) and (13) coincides with the
analytical steady state given in (11).
4.3. Business Cycle Properties of the Model
Before going on it is important to discuss the qualitative properties of the business
cycle in this economy. I focus on nine variables i) non ﬁnancial output, ii) ﬁnancial
output, iii) GDP, iv) consumption, v) percentage of employment allocated to ﬁnal
good production, vi) wage, vii) deposit rate, viii) lending rate and ix) interest rate
spread. All these variables are in real terms and GDP, real wage and consumption
are in terms of ﬁnal good output. Given the realized value of z and the optimal
values of N1,Dand D0, ﬁnal good output, banking output, GDP and consumption
can be computed in the following way:
• Banking output or capital stock =⇒ K = ezDγ(1 − N1)1−γ
• Final good output =⇒ Y = KαN11−α
• GDP =⇒ Y + pK
• Consumption =⇒ C = Y − D0
where p is the relative price of banking output or lending rate of the economy.
Naturally, this lending rate as well as the wage (w) and deposit rate (R) do not
come out of the planner’s problem. However, given the optimal values for D and
N1, wage, deposit rate and lending rate can be calculated invoking the recursive
competitive equilibrium, in the following way :
• Lending rate (or relative price of banking output) =⇒ p = αKα−1N11−α
• Deposit rate =⇒ R = pezγDγ−1(1 − N1)1−γ
21• Wage =⇒ w =( 1− α)KαN1−α = pez(1 − γ)Dγ(1 − N1)−γ
With decision rules (12) and (13) and starting from steady state, the economy
was simulated for 220 periods, 100 times. The ﬁrst 100 observations of each sim-
ulation were discarded and the data was logged and ﬁltered with the Hodrick and
Prescott ﬁlter. Some statistics revealing the business cycle properties of the econ-
omy are reported in Appendix 3. Speciﬁcally, I report the sample mean across all
simulations for the i) mean, ii) percent standard deviation, iii) contemporaneous
correlations and iv) correlations with output (up to ﬁve lags and leads) of the
deviations from the HP trend of the natural log of these nine variables in each
simulation. The sample standard deviations of these statistics are also reported.
These statistics are illustrative of business cycle properties if business cycles are
deﬁned as deviations of real economic activity from the Hodrick-Prescott trend.
Simply put, regularities of the business cycle are the comovements of the devia-
tions from trend of the diﬀerent macroeconomic time series.
The business cycle properties of this economy are quite intuitive. First of all
note that total GDP, ﬁnal good output and banking sector output are perfectly
correlated with each other. Nevertheless, production in the ﬁnancial sector is two
times more volatile than in the ﬁnal good producing sector. This is not surprising
given that the banking sector is directly exposed to a stochastic productivity
shock while the ﬁnal good producing sector is not. Consequently, this economy is
one where the intermediary sector is much more unstable than the non-ﬁnancial
sector.
Turning to prices, note that the wage of this economy is procyclical and ﬂuc-
tuates as much as GDP. On the other hand, the lending rate is almost as volatile
as GDP and more than one and a half times as volatile as the deposit rate. Ad-
ditionally, the level of volatility of the spread between both interest rates is more
than twice as high as that of the deposit rate and 30% higher than that of the
lending rate. This is expected given that, in equilibrium, the spread is inversely
related to the marginal productivity of deposits which, in turn, depends directly
on the stochastic shock.
Note also that the deposit rate leads the cycle. This is a natural result given
that the cycle of this economy is driven by shocks to the ﬁnancial sector. In
fact, a good shock to the banking sector increases the marginal productivity of
deposits. Eﬃciency in the banking sector implies a contemporaneous rise in the
deposit rate. This deposit rate hike induces agents to contemporaneously increase
their stock of deposits. Nevertheless, deposit decisions in period t only become
productive in period t +1 . Thus, even though ﬁnal good output will rise in the
22period of the shock due to the increase of banking output (i.e. capital), GDP
will peak only in the following period when the higher stock of deposits becomes
productive. As a result, it is natural for the deposit rate to lead the cycle. In
contrast, note that the lending rate is completely anticyclical. When GDP is in
the trough the lending rate is peaking and vice-versa. The underlying idea is very
simple. Suppose that an adverse shock hits the banking sector in any period t.
This implies a fall in banking output. The resulting reduction in capital supply
generates two eﬀects. First, it reduces ﬁnal good output. Second, it creates a rise
in the relative price of capital as this market adjusts to a fall in supply. While
the former eﬀect implies a fall in GDP, the latter is just a lending rate hike. This
explains the anticyclical feature of the lending rate.
5. FINANCIAL CRISIS
A natural starting point is to deﬁne the concept of a banking or ﬁnancial crisis.
The focus is on episodes of generalized ﬁnancial distress or systematic bank fail-
ures throughout the economy. This is the relevant analogy to Colombia in the
late 1990’s. I associate a ﬁnancial crisis to an adverse stochastic productivity
shock experienced by the intermediary sector. No doubt this is a very broad def-
inition of what a banking or ﬁnancial crisis really is. Yet, my deﬁnition manages
to capture the perverse eﬀects of mismanagement, overinvestment, excessive risk
taking, panics, poor regulation, macroeconomic inestability and a weak institu-
tional structure in an economy’s ﬁnancial system. As everybody knows, these
illnesses reduce banking productivity and are what ultimately trigger banking
crisis phenomena. Since banking productivity falls during episodes of ﬁnancial
distress, adverse productivity shocks to the intermediary sector are a sensible
way to pin down ﬁnancial crises. An alternative interpretation follows Bernanke
(1983). During banking crises there is a loss of intermediation capital which is sim-
ply bank-client private information that rises intermediation productivity. Thus,
an adverse stochastic shock to the productivity of the ﬁnancial system is a simple
way to pin down the loss of intermediation capital during a banking crisis.
With an adverse stochastic productivity shock to the ﬁnancial system I am not
claiming that the only cause of the Colombian banking crisis is rooted in problems
speciﬁc to the banking sector. I am not ruling out macroeconomic shocks as a pos-
sible trigger of the banking crisis. For example, with an unstable macroeconomic
environment bank managers probably are less productive in forecasting many of
the relevant variables (interest rates, exchange rates, etc.) than in a stable econ-
23omy. Productivity in the ﬁnancial sector is not divorced from macroeconomic
behavior. For sure, both micro and macro elements had a role in the crisis. But
this is not inconsistent with the way in which the crisis is engineered into the
model. The only purpose of the shock to the ﬁnancial sector is i) to recognize
that a crisis occurred and ii) to pin that crisis down in a simple and tractable way.
5.1. Results for the Model
In terms of the model, a banking crisis episode is engineered with an adverse shock
to z. To simulate the ﬁnancial crisis I set the economy at its steady state and
then make the intermediary sector suﬀer a one standard deviation negative shock
in ε. The impulse-response graphs of i) ﬁnal good output, ii) banking output, iii)
GDP, iv) consumption, v) labor allocated to the non-ﬁnancial sector, vi) wage,
vii) deposit rate, viii) lending rate and ix) interest rate spread are reported in
Appendix 4. Recall that these variables are in real terms and, speciﬁcally, in
terms of ﬁnal good output. The ﬁnancial crisis generates the following eﬀects:
• C o n t r a c t i o no fn o n - ﬁnancial or ﬁnal good output. This is a natural result
given that the adverse shock to the ﬁnancial sector reduces the availability
of capital stock in the economy. This variable reaches its lowest level four
quarters after the crisis is triggered and converges back to its steady state
level approximately 22 quarters (or ﬁve and a half years) after that.
• Contraction of ﬁnancial or banking output. This is a direct result of the
adverse shock to the ﬁnancial sector. This variable reaches its lowest level
four quarters after the crisis starts and converges back to its steady state
level approximately 18 quarters (or four and a half years) after that.
• Contraction of GDP. This is not surprising given the contraction of the
ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial sectors of the economy. GDP reaches its lowest
level four quarters after the crisis is triggered and converges back to its
steady state level approximately 20 periods (or ﬁve years) after that.
• Consumption also falls on impact with the crisis. It reaches its lowest level
four quarters after the shock and then takes 16/20 more periods to return
back to its steady state level. In other words, a ﬁnancial crisis reduces
consumption below its steady state level during a period of ﬁve to six years.
• No reallocation of labor across sectors in the economy. This result is illus-
trative of a feature of the model that was highlighted in a previous section:
24shocks are completely absorbed by prices so that the resulting wage (in
terms of ﬁnal good) is equalized across sectors without any change in the
allocation of labor to the sectors.
• The real wage falls on impact with the ﬁnancial crisis. The reason is that the
adverse shock to the banking sector reduces the marginal productivity of its
labor. The reduced capital supply also reduces the marginal productivity of
labor in the ﬁnal good producing sector. Again, the relative price of banking
output adjusts so that the marginal productivity of labor in terms of ﬁnal
good remains identical, yet lower, in both sectors without any reallocation
of labor. Now, the real wage reaches its lowest level ﬁve quarters after the
crisis starts and converges back to its steady state level approximately 19
quarters after that.
• The deposit rate falls on impact with the crisis but then rises immediately
above its steady state level before converging back to it. This rate peaks
eight quarters after the crisis is triggered and converges back to its steady
state level 18 quarters (four and a half years) after that. This pattern is
a result of the model’s dynamics. The adverse shock to the intermediary
sector reduces the marginal productivity of deposits. Eﬃciency dictates that
the deposit rate must fall contemporaneously with the crisis. But the shock
also reduces the supply of capital and, consequently, of ﬁnal good. This
implies that there are less resources available for consumption and deposits.
Thus, consumption smoothing implies that deposits taken into the following
period are reduced. As a result, the marginal productivity of deposits rises
in the next period meaning that, in equilibrium, the deposit rate must rise
in the next period.
• The lending rate, on the other hand, rises immediately with the crisis, peaks
four quarters after the shock and then converges back to its steady state level
very slowly (44 quarters after the shock). This pattern has simple economics
behind it. The adverse shock to the intermediary sector reduces the supply
of banking output. This implies a reduction in the stock of capital available
to the ﬁnal good producing ﬁrm. Equilibrium requires that the relative
price of capital or lending rate rises. After that, it evolves oppositely to how
banking output or capital supply evolves.
• Finally, the interest rate spread follows a pattern similar to that of the
lending rate. It peaks contemporaneously with the crisis and then converges
25very slowly (43 periods after the shock) back to its steady state level. This
behavior is expected given that, in equilibrium, the interest rate spread is
given by the inverse of the marginal productivity of deposits which falls
during the crisis.
5.2. Comparison with Data
I argue that it is sensible to assume that an adverse ﬁnancial shock hit the Colom-
bian economy towards the end of 1997 or beginning of 1998. Recall from a previ-
ous section that it was in the ﬁrst months of 1998 when the following phenomena
began: i) fast rise in the percentage of unproductive assets in the Colombian ﬁ-
nancial sector and ii) dramatic fall in the sector’s net worth. Consequently, the
view taken in this paper is that the Colombian ﬁnancial crisis began in the last
months of 1997 or the ﬁrst months of 1998. If this is true, the model’s variables
respond to the artiﬁcial ﬁnancial crisis in a way that replicates qualitatively most
of the features observed in the behavior of the same variables in Colombia during
the period of ﬁnancial distress (end of 1997/early 1998-):
• Four/ﬁve quarter contraction of non-ﬁnancial output, GDP and consump-
tion.
• Five/six quarter contraction of the real wage.
• Minimal ﬂuctuations in the percentage of employment allocated to the non-
ﬁnancial sectors. The model replicates this behavior in extreme since the
ﬁnancial shock induces no reallocation of labor across sectors at all.
• Fall/rise pattern of the real deposit rate in a lapse of two years.
• Hike of the real loan rate during four/ﬁve quarters.
• Hike of the interest rate spread.
One caveat applies. According to the model, ﬁnancial output should have
started its recovery by now. Nonetheless, Colombian data shows that its cyclical
component continues to fall. Besides, the model predicts that once a variable
begins to converge back to its steady state level it does so monotonically. However,
towards the end of 1999 the real wage started to fall again after three quarters
of recovery. Also, by the third quarter of 1999 the real deposit rate began to fall
again below its trend or steady state level (as if a new adverse ﬁnancial shock had
26shown up). Moreover, by the ﬁrst quarter of 2000 the interest rate spread still
does not present a reversal of its cyclical rise.
In terms of the model, all this could be interpreted as another adverse ﬁnancial
shock hitting the Colombian economy towards the third quarter or end of 1999. In
other words it could mean that the ﬁnancial crisis has been deepened by another
adverse ﬁnancial shock that hit the Colombian economy in the second semester of
1999. But this is to be determined. If other variables like GDP, consumption and
non-ﬁnancial output enter into a new cyclical contraction and the real loan rate
enters into a new cyclical hike, the continuation of the ﬁnancial crisis is likely to
be the case.
5.3. What to Expect
Even if the ﬁnancial crisis comprises only an adverse shock in 1997/1998, the ef-
fects of that shock should last for several quarters. If this is the case, according
to the model and ceteris paribus ﬁnancial output, non-ﬁnancial output, GDP and
consumption will take around ﬁve years (after they stop falling) to return to their
trend or steady state level. Since, non-ﬁnancial output, GDP and consumption
stopped falling in the second quarter of 1999, it should take around four more
years from now before these aggregates return back to their trend or steady state
level in the absence of other shocks. This result is consistent with stylized facts
documented in the literature for Latin America: “...even where policymakers man-
aged the crisis by following appropriate policies, resolving banking cries took four
or ﬁve years and required major adjustments in the real economy.” (Rojas-Suarez
and Weisbrod, pp. 3)
It also takes around ﬁve years for the real wage to converge back to its steady
state level after it stops falling. According to this result and recalling that the real
wage ﬁrst stopped falling in the ﬁrst quarter of 1999, it should take around three
and a half years from now for this variable to return to its trend level. However,
recall that the real wage started to fall again in the fourth quarter of 1999 (as if
an e wa d v e r s eﬁnancial shock had hit the economy by then). Moreover, ﬁnancial
output has not stopped falling and the behavior of prices like the real deposit
rate and the interest rate spread also suggest that a new adverse ﬁnancial shock
probably hit the Colombian economy towards mid/late 1999 (see the previous
section).
If it is true that a new adverse ﬁnancial shock hit the economy towards
mid/late 1999, then the period of recovery and convergence of non-ﬁnancial out-
27put, ﬁnancial output, GDP, consumption and the real wage will be extended even
further (to ﬁve years from now approximately) due to the cyclical contraction that
these variables will exhibit with the new shock. Moreover, we should also expect
soon a new hike of the real deposit and loan rate. As well, a continuation of the
transitory rise in the interest rate spread should be expected. Once the deposit
rate stops rising, it should take around four years for this rate to return back to
its steady state level. It should take around ten years for the eﬀects of the shock
over the loan rate and the spread to vanish completely.
Of course, other shocks could speed up the return of the economy to its steady
state by oﬀsetting the adverse ﬁnancial shock. For example, a positive terms of
t r a d es h o c kl i k et h er e c e n to i lp r i c er i s ec o u l ds p e e du pt h er e c o v e r yo fG D Pa n d
consumption. Nevertheless, the results of the model suggest that the sole eﬀects
of the adverse ﬁnancial shock are signiﬁcant and long-lasting.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a simple version of the optimal growth model where banks
absorb real resources from the economy and are also vulnerable to crises. An arti-
ﬁcial ﬁnancial distress shock is engineered into the model in order to understand
the macroeconomic consequences of a ﬁnancial crisis. I ﬁnd that a ﬁnancial crisis
generates a contraction of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial output and, consequently, of
GDP. Consumption also falls on impact with the crisis. Surprisingly, the ﬁnancial
crisis does not induce a reallocation of labor across sectors but the real wage falls
on impact. The deposit rate also falls on impact with the crisis and then rises
above its steady state level before converging back to it. This pattern is a result
of the model’s dynamics. The lending rate, on the other hand, rises immediately
with the crisis and then converges back to its steady state level. Finally, the
interest rate spread follows the same pattern as the lending rate.
The results are useful because they replicate the recent behavior of several
macroeconomic variables in Colombia. Moreover, they give some insight into
what should be expected from these variables in the near future. There are two
fundamental take aways from this paper. First, the negative wealth and welfare
eﬀects of the Colombian ﬁnancial crisis are non-negligible and long lasting (ﬁve
years approximately). Second, the data suggests that the crisis which permeated
the Colombian ﬁnancial system since the last months of 1997 or ﬁrst months of
1998 has been deepened by another adverse ﬁnancial shock that hit the Colombian
intermediary sector in mid/late 1999.
287. BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. BHATTACHARYA, J., M. GUZMAN, E. HUYBENS and B. SMITH,
1994, “Monetary, Fiscal and Bank Regulatory Policy in a Simple Mone-
tary Growth Model,” Center for Analytic Economics, Working Paper No.
94-14.
2. BERNANKE, B., 1983, “Nonmonetary Eﬀects of the Financial Crisis in
Propagation of the Great Depression,” American Economic Review, 73, pp.
257-276.
3. BOYD, J. and B. SMITH, 1995, “The Evolution of Debt and Equity Markets
in Economic Development,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research
Department, Working Paper No. 542.
4. COLE, H. and L. OHANIAN, 2000, “Re-Examining the Contributions of
Money and Banking Shocks to the US. Great Depression,” Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis Research Department, mimeo.
5. CORSETTI, G., PESENTI, P. and N. ROUBINI, 1998,“Paper Tigers? A
Model of the Asian Crisis,” NBER, December.
6. CHARI, V., JONES, L. and R. MANUELLI, 1995, “The Growth Eﬀects of
Monetary Policy,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review,
Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 18-32.
7. DEMIRGUC-KUNT, A. and E. DETRAGIACHE, 1997, “The Determinants
of Banking Crises: Evidence from Developed and Developing Countries,”
World Bank Working Paper No. 1828, September.
8. DIAMOND, P. A., 1965, “National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model,”
American Economic Review, 32, pp. 233-240.
9. DIAMOND, D., 1984, “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitor-
ing,” Review of Economic Studies, 51, pp. 393-414.
10. DIAMOND, D. and P. H. DYBVIG, 1983, “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance,
and Liquidity,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 91, No. 3.
291 1 . D I A Z - G I M E N E Z ,J .D . ,E .C .P R E S C O T T , T .F I T Z G E R A L Da n dF .A L -
VAREZ, 1992, “Banking in Computable General Equilibrium Economies,”
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 16, pp. 533-559.
12. EDWARDS, S. and C. VEGH, 1997, “Banks and Macroeconomic Distur-
bances Under Predetermined Exchange Rates,” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 40, pp. 239-278.
13. GALOR, O., 1992, “A Two-Sector Overlapping-Generations Model : A
Global Characterization of the Dynamical System,” Econometrica, Vol. 60,
No. 6, pp. 1351-1386.
14. GARBER, P. and S. WEISBROD, 1992, The Economics of Banking, Liq-
uidity and Money, D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, Massachusetts.
15. KAMINSKY, G. and C. REINHART, 1996, “The Twin Crises: The Causes
of Banking and Balance of Payments Problems,” mimeo, Board of Governors
and University of Maryland, September.
16. KRUGMAN, P., 1998, “What Happened to Asia?” mimeo, MIT, January.
17. ROJAS-SUAREZ, L. and S. WEISBROD, 1996, “Banking Crises in Latin
America: Experiences and Issues,” in Banking Crises in Latin America,
Inter-American Development Bank, John Hopkins University Press, Balti-
more, Maryland.
18. SCHNEIDER, M. and A. TORNELL, 1999, “Lending Booms and Specula-
tive Crises,” Working Paper, Harvard University.
30;1 DSSHQGL[ 4= F|folfdo Ehkdylru ri Pdfurhfrqrplf Ydul0



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































689. APPENDIX 2: Calibration
















































Equation (A1) is very intuitive because it is saying that (in a stationary environ-
ment) the higher the relative weight of labor in the ﬁrm’s production function,
(1 − α), and the higher the weight of deposits in the bank’s production function,
γ, the higher the fraction of total labor allocated to the ﬁrm, N1.A sar e s u l t ,t h e
higher the relative weight of labor in the bank’s production function, (1−γ),a n d
the higher the weight of capital in the ﬁrm’s production function, α, the higher
























where Y and B stand for ﬁnal good output and banking output, respectively.
According to the model, banking output is equal to the stock of capital. Thus,
(A2) is:








Equations (A1) and (A2) can be manipulated for calibration purposes. Indeed,



















The following features in the data would allow for a proper calibration:
1. Fraction of total labor allocated to the ﬁnal good producing sector. This
pins down N1.
2. Elasticity of non-ﬁnancial output to capital. This determines α.
3. Ratio of deposits to non-ﬁnancial output. This pins down D/Y .
With α and N1 equation (A3) determines γ.W i t hα, γ,a n dD/Y , equation
(A4) pins down β. The only parameter that is still pending for calibration is
θ,t h ec o e ﬃcient of relative risk aversion. This parameter cannot be calibrated
from the model’s steady state equations. Therefore, the simplest way to treat this
parameter is as exogenously given. In fact, the most appropriate thing to do is to
solve the model using a sensible range of values for θ,s a yθ ∈ [1,5].
37APPENDIX 3: Business Cycle Properties of the Model
SAMPLE MEANS ACROSS SIMULATIONS
MEANS* ST. DEV. (%)
GDP 0,5373 1,4709
Final Good Output 0,3558 1,4709
Banking Output 0,1431 2,8841
Consumption 0,2050 1,4593
Labor to Final Good 0,9190 0,0000
Wage 0,1897 1,4709
Deposit. Rate 1,1016 0,8599
Lending Rate 1,2707 1,4132
Spread 1,1535 1,8369
* Of non-filtered data.
CONTEMPORANEOUS CORRELATIONS
GDP Final Good Banking Cons. Labor to Wage Deposit Lending Spread
Output Output Final Good Rate Rate
GDP 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 0,9967 0,9870 1,0000 0,2638 -1,0000 -0,8915
Final Good Output 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 0,9967 0,9870 1,0000 0,2638 -1,0000 -0,8915
Banking Output 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 0,9967 0,9870 1,0000 0,2638 -1,0000 -0,8915
Consumption 0,9967 0,9967 0,9967 1,0000 0,9966 0,9967 0,3389 -0,9967 -0,9245
Labor to Final Good 0,9870 0,9870 0,9870 0,9966 1,0000 0,9870 0,4140 -0,9870 -0,9526
Wage 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 0,9967 0,9870 1,0000 0,2638 -1,0000 -0,8915
Deposit. Rate 0,2638 0,2638 0,2638 0,3389 0,4140 0,2638 1,0000 -0,2638 -0,6698
Lending Rate -1,0000 -1,0000 -1,0000 -0,9967 -0,9870 -1,0000 -0,2638 1,0000 0,8915
Spread -0,8915 -0,8915 -0,8915 -0,9245 -0,9526 -0,8915 -0,6698 0,8915 1,0000 CORRELATION WITH GDPt
(t-5) (t-4) (t-3) (t-2) (t-1) t (t+1) (t+2) (t+3) (t+4) (t+5)
GDP -0,0296 0,1508 0,3682 0,6112 0,8463 1,0000 0,8463 0,6112 0,3682 0,1508 -0,0296
Final Good Output -0,0296 0,1508 0,3682 0,6112 0,8463 1,0000 0,8463 0,6112 0,3682 0,1508 -0,0296
Banking Output -0,0296 0,1508 0,3682 0,6112 0,8463 1,0000 0,8463 0,6112 0,3682 0,1508 -0,0296
Consumption -0,0063 0,1764 0,3933 0,6328 0,8595 0,9967 0,8023 0,5555 0,3158 0,1084 -0,0604
Labor to Final Good 0,0180 0,2020 0,4170 0,6514 0,8679 0,9870 0,7520 0,4944 0,2598 0,0639 -0,0919
Wage -0,0296 0,1508 0,3682 0,6112 0,8463 1,0000 0,8463 0,6112 0,3682 0,1508 -0,0296
Deposit. Rate 0,2728 0,3536 0,4124 0,4445 0,4163 0,2638 -0,2755 -0,4957 -0,5365 -0,4876 -0,4045
Lending Rate 0,0296 -0,1508 -0,3682 -0,6112 -0,8463 -1,0000 -0,8463 -0,6112 -0,3682 -0,1508 0,0296
Spread -0,1083 -0,2857 -0,4803 -0,6812 -0,8466 -0,8915 -0,5195 -0,2374 -0,0344 0,1075 0,2061SAMPLE STANDARD DEVIATIONS ACROSS SIMULATIONS
MEANS* ST. DEV. (%)
GDP 0,0081 0,2267
Final Good Output 0,0054 0,2267
Banking Output 0,0042 0,4444
Consumption 0,0030 0,2151
Labor to Final Good 0,0000 0,0000
Wage 0,0029 0,2267
Deposit. Rate 0,0011 0,0690
Lending Rate 0,0184 0,2178
Spread 0,0159 0,2028
* Of non-filtered data.
CONTEMPORANEOUS CORRELATIONS
GDP Final Good Banking Cons. Labor to Wage Deposit Lending Spread
Output Output Final Good Rate Rate
GDP 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0007 0,0024 0,0000 0,0618 0,0000 0,0112
Final Good Output 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0007 0,0024 0,0000 0,0618 0,0000 0,0112
Banking Output 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0007 0,0024 0,0000 0,0618 0,0000 0,0112
Consumption 0,0007 0,0007 0,0007 0,0000 0,0007 0,0007 0,0670 0,0007 0,0069
Labor to Final Good 0,0024 0,0024 0,0024 0,0007 0,0000 0,0024 0,0678 0,0024 0,0033
Wage 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0007 0,0024 0,0000 0,0618 0,0000 0,0112
Deposit. Rate 0,0618 0,0618 0,0618 0,0670 0,0678 0,0618 0,0000 0,0618 0,0606
Lending Rate 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0007 0,0024 0,0000 0,0618 0,0000 0,0112
Spread 0,0112 0,0112 0,0112 0,0069 0,0033 0,0112 0,0606 0,0112 0,0000 CORRELATION WITH GDPt
(t-5) (t-4) (t-3) (t-2) (t-1) t (t+1) (t+2) (t+3) (t+4) (t+5)
GDP 0,1446 0,1359 0,1208 0,0891 0,0415 0,0000 0,0415 0,0891 0,1208 0,1359 0,1446
Final Good Output 0,1446 0,1359 0,1208 0,0891 0,0415 0,0000 0,0415 0,0891 0,1208 0,1359 0,1446
Banking Output 0,1446 0,1359 0,1208 0,0891 0,0415 0,0000 0,0415 0,0891 0,1208 0,1359 0,1446
Consumption 0,1418 0,1325 0,1177 0,0863 0,0396 0,0007 0,0510 0,0981 0,1253 0,1360 0,1425
Labor to Final Good 0,1394 0,1300 0,1156 0,0849 0,0390 0,0024 0,0598 0,1052 0,1278 0,1346 0,1393
Wage 0,1446 0,1359 0,1208 0,0891 0,0415 0,0000 0,0415 0,0891 0,1208 0,1359 0,1446
Deposit. Rate 0,1172 0,1007 0,0836 0,0674 0,0624 0,0618 0,0314 0,0388 0,0543 0,0800 0,1012
Lending Rate 0,1446 0,1359 0,1208 0,0891 0,0415 0,0000 0,0415 0,0891 0,1208 0,1359 0,1446
Spread 0,1293 0,1206 0,1090 0,0821 0,0405 0,0112 0,0837 0,1190 0,1244 0,1190 0,1205